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THE TAXATION OF PROFIT INTERESTS
AND THE REVERSE MANCUR OLSON PHENOMENON
DARRYLL K. JONES*

PROLOGUE

It is impolite, one supposes, to talk about politics in mixed company.
For purposes of this Article, "mixed company" refers to the thoroughly
heterogeneous groups interested in any particular item of tax legislation.'

Copyright © 2008, Darryll K. Jones.
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. LLM (Tax), University of
Florida, 1994. This Article is based on a presentation given at the Capital University
School of Law's Annual Business and Tax Annual CLE Program, November 9, 2007. It
also arose from the author's experiences as a witness during House and Senate Hearings
Congressional hearings conducted in summer and fall 2007 regarding the taxation of profitinterests. Hearings on CarriedInterest H1 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong.
(July 31, 2007) (statement of Darryll K. Jones), available at http://finance.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony/2007test/073107testdj.pdf; Hearing on Fair and Equitable Tax
Policy For America's Working Families Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
110th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2007) (statement of Darryll K. Jones), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=6431.
On the other hand, a legal realist might suppose that one cannot possibly separate
politics, broadly defined, from anything, especially the topic of tax reform:
Many of the problems with most contemporary analysis of the
federal income tax can be traced to this untenable assumption that those
policies conveniently lumped together under the rubric of tax reform
are something other than the expression of a particular political
perspective, one that has its own agenda, favoring certain interests over
others, and with its own constituency that derives considerable political
satisfaction and benefits from success in the political arena. Tax
reformism is political by nature precisely because any change (whether
designated as reform or otherwise) to existing political institutions and
extant legal structures has distinct political implications. The adoption
of any significant change to the tax law constitutes a political act.
Indeed, the very decision to adopt an income tax is a political decision
of the highest order. Those who characterize those diverse changes to
the Code that were enacted in 1986 as tax reform are implicitly
adopting the false dichotomy that there are "good" changes (those
designated as tax reform which pursue the public interest and somehow
rise above politics) and "bad" changes (those which favor special
(continued)
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Mixed company exists with any combination of democrats, republicans,
special interest groups, legislators, lobbyists, judges, advocates, moralists,
scholars, rich, poor, capitalists, laborers, and other persons, whether
individually or collectively, and of any disparate description, quite frankly,
whose economic or moral interests are in the least bit implicated by
taxation. In mixed company, then, politics are never, or hardly ever to be
explicitly acknowledged as the absolute trump card of any given tax statute
or decision .
Violations of this implicit social rule usually result in
personal offense, since mixed company necessarily implies mixed, if not
diametrically opposed, viewpoints.
The preceding observation presented itself at the January 2008 Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, during which the
intellectual father of the most attended to subchapter K 3 legislative reform

interests and are the product of politics). This untenable classification
permeates contemporary analysis of the politics of tax policy.
The pretense underlying this conceptual framework ultimately
denigrates the political process. It presupposes that the traditional
congressional policymaking process is "corrupt" to the extent it is
tainted by politicians and interest group politics, while genuine tax
reform constitutes that rare triumph of reason and the pure science of
tax policymaking. Such sentiments betray a utopian longing for the day
when tax academics will leave the universities and think tanks and take
over the reins of the Treasury Department, and perhaps the membership
of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees as well.
Presumably, when that happens, tax reform no longer will be a mere
aberration or departure from politics as usual, as it was in 1986.
Instead, rational policymaking finally would supplant politics as usual.
Sheldon Pollack, Tax Reform: The 1980's in Perspective, 46 TAx L. REv. 489, 491 (1991)
(emphasis added). This Article concerns the effect of collective political action on the
recent efforts to reform the taxation of profit interest. Throughout, I try to avoid subjective
judgments regarding whether that effect is "good" or "bad."
2 Sheldon Pollack is one of the few scholars who has written extensively regarding the
direct influence of politics in the tax legislative process. See id.; Sheldon Pollack, A New
Dynamics of Tax Policy, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 61, 62 (1995) (concluding that the instability
of the tax legislative process results from a number of "long term political trends").
3 Laws relating to the taxation of partners and other owners electing to be treated as
partners are contained in subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code, comprising 1.R.C.

§§ 701-61.
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proposal since 1954, Professor Victor Fleischer,4 noted with palpable
disgust and a gloomy visage that his thoroughly sensible efforts to reform
the taxation of "profit interests" appeared doomed; not just politely
declined with thanks, but repudiated in the most pejorative sense, as in the
same sense as Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton's efforts to reform health
care some fifteen years earlier.5 In short, the problem with which Fleischer
was concerned was that persons providing services to a partnership and
receiving
amounts
indisputably
and substantively
representing
compensation for services (a fact admitted even by the recipients) are,
under current law, able to convert income from services into income from6
property and thereby gain access to preferential capital gains tax rates.
Fleischer's reform proposal essentially called for the reinstatement of longheld tax policy to correct a glaring but little publicized inequity.7 Very
highly paid service providers were taxed at 20% less than much lower paid
service providers, for reasons having nothing to do with policy assertions
made in support of capital gains taxation.8 Fleischer's idea, originally
4 See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing PartnershipProfits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2008) (regarding the need to reform partnership tax laws so

that recipients of profit interest are prevented from converting ordinary income into capital
gains). See also Note, Taxing Private Equity CarriedInterest Using Incentive Stock Option
Analysis, 121 HARV. L. REV. 846, 846 (2008) [hereinafter Taxing Private Equity] ("Rarely

does an idea that germinates in a law review article catch the attention of Congress. Even
more rarely does such an idea inspire policy statements by presidential candidates.
Recently, however, an idea that originated in Professor Victor Fleischer's forthcoming
article, Two and Twenty: Taxing PartnershipProfits in Private Equity Funds, has done
both. The issue to which it relates is the taxation of the so-called 'carried interest' that

private equity professionals earn from their funds' investments.")
5See Health Care Reform-Deadfor Now, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at A24.
6See generally Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of CarriedInterests, 116 TAx NOTES 183
(2007).

7 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 3-7.
8The amounts earned by hedge and private equity fund managers are so large that they
raise the danger that correct analysis of underlying tax issues might be skewed by envy:
Given the fact that these funds are private, no comprehensive
figures on managers' compensation are available, although a number of
consultants and trade groups do publish estimates. According to Alpha
magazine, the top 25 hedge fund managers earned $14 billion in 2006.
Comparable annual lists are not published for private equity managers,
probably because cash distributions occur less frequently than in hedge
funds, and there is greater year-to-year variation. One estimate is that
managers earned $45 billion over the past six years.
(continued)
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hailed as necessary as a matter of fairness, 9 has since been effectively
caricatured as yet another example of government's anti-capitalist
confiscatory fiscal policy. l With that, the idea once talked about in circles
whose inhabitants used words and phrases such as "reform," "horizontal
equity" and "distributive justice" had been exiled to American tax reform's
version of Siberia, perhaps to languish for a period of "re-education,"
perhaps to await a resurrection and vindication many years hence.,l
Regardless, it is useful towards a better understanding of the structure and
purposes of our tax code to pause and consider the path to the status quo
ante with respect to the taxation of partnership profit interests. If nothing
else, reconsideration of the path to the present location rehabilitates and
consoles, if such is necessary, the messenger-in this case, Professor
Fleischer. More importantly, though, it forces upon us the intellectual
honesty that ultimately allows for a higher regard of our tax topic.
Perhaps, too, intellectual honesty will eventually lead to the reform that
MARK JICKLING

&

DONALD J. MARPLES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT,

TAXATION OF HEDGE FUND AND

PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGERS

(July 5,

2007)

1, 4,

http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22689. Another commentator notes that in 2006, "the
top hedge fund and private equity managers in America earned an average of $658 million
each, which is 22,255 times the pay of the average U.S. Worker. And of course all of these
earnings were taxed at just a 15 percent rate." Hearing on Fairand Equitable Tax Policy
for America's Working Families Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong.
(Sept. 6, 2007) (Statement of Leo Hindery, Jr., Managing Director, InterMedia Partners),
availableat http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=6436.
9 See Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2007, § Business, at 4 ("Why shouldn't they pay taxes like the rest of us?").
10One partisan argues, in the guise of academic research, that:
Taxing carried interests as ordinary income rather than as capital
gains would eliminate the "sweat equity" tax incentive to create small
businesses. The likely result would be a reduction in entrepreneurial
activities including those associated with the restructuring of inefficient
corporations. In turn, this reduction could deter business investment
and slow economic growth.
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, RESEARCH REP.

110-14,

CARRIED INTERESTS, TAXATION,

AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 3 (Oct. 22, 2007), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/

ResearchReports/2007/rr 10-14.pdf.
11President-elect Obama's tax plan promises to reform the taxation of profit interests.
See Barack Obama's Comprehensive Tax Plan, available at http://wwwbarackobama.com/
pdf/taxes/Factsheet Tax Plan FINAL.pdf (promising to "[c]los[e] other loopholes:
including taxing [profit] interest as ordinary income") (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
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ought to have initially occurred but which now seems destined to die in
exile or await resurrection only after many more years of injustice.
There is a wealth of scholarship, some predating and some provoked
by Fleisher's original observations, concerning the taxation of amounts
paid to fund managers.' 2 The scholarship thoroughly and accurately
describes the tedious details of profit interest taxation. Until now,
academic discussion regarding profit interests has been characterized by an
implicit surrealism that fails to account for the rent-seeking and rentextraction in which all stakeholders, truth be told, engage.' 3 The purpose
of this Article is not to repeat the tedious details, though at times it will be
necessary to do so. The Article attempts to identify the politics-the rentseeking and rent extraction motivations-that have resulted in the
continuation of the otherwise illogical approach to the taxation of profit
interests. "Political science" is, after all, a recognized science precisely
because there are socio-political cause and effect relationships that ought to
be considered with respect to any area of law or government.
Identification of cause predicts and explains effect; the present exercise
will therefore contribute a sense, however unsatisfactory that sense may be,
of rationality to our topic. Without an understanding of political realities,
we would be left to conclude that the taxation of profit interests is an
irrational aberration. Worse, we might question whether there is any
rationality at all to the tax code. It is the latter possibility with which tax
scholars ought to be most concerned, even if only for reasons of selfpreservation. Scholars are very nearly uniform in the conclusion that the
yield from service partners-the name given to those fortunate enough to
be granted an interest in exchange for their labor-is incorrectly and
unfairly taxed at rates lower than the compensation earned by other
laborers. 14 Yet the law continues to ignore this consensus, suggesting that
12

See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The Carried Interest

Controversy: Let's Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAX L. REV. 121 (2008); Chris William
Sanchirico, Taxing Carry: The ProblematicAnalogy to "Sweat Equity", 117 TAX NOTES
239 (2007); Abrams, supra note 6. For a much longer list of articles see id. at 239, n. 1.
13 For an in-depth discussion of rent-seeking and rent extraction, see FRED S.
MCCHESNEY,

MONEY FOR NOTHING:

POLITICIANS,

RENT EXTRACTION AND POLITICAL

EXTORTION (1997).
14The best source from which to measure the nearly unanimous consensus amongst tax

scholars is online. One widely read blog contained this recent post:
While the political issue is very much up in the air in DC, even among
some Democrats, it's safe to say that there is an academic consensus
among tax profs on the issue: the status quo is problematic, and it
(continued)
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scholars just don't know what they are talking about or are, as is often
alleged are "out of touch" with the real world.' 5 Thus, the taxation of
profit interests in subchapter K serves to indict the entire tax code; unless
rationally explained, what can only otherwise be labeled an unexplained
aberration will serve as an accusation that the tax code, and indeed those
who are its presumptively objective caretakers-tax scholars-are entirely
lacking in rationality.
The Article proceeds from this point through four acts, each of which
highlights, largely without subjective judgment whenever possible, the
rent-seeking and rent extraction motivations animating the outcomes.
Indeed, the Article agrees with the idea that rent seeking and rent
extractions are rational behaviors and indeed may even have a legitimate
place in tax law.' 6 So, in Act I the Article describes the law as it came to
be as a result of Diamond v. Commissioner,17 a relatively small dollar
amount case that challenged the unstated political compromise theretofore
should be addressed .... We may not all agree on exactly what to do
about the tax issue--(1) tax the grant of a profits interest at ordinary
income rates, (2) tax the returns at ordinary income rates at the back
end, or (3) a hybrid approach (like my Cost of Capital or loan
approach), or (4) even repealing the capital gains preference altogether.
Some of us would apply the changes to all partnerships, others would
limit it to smaller partnerships. But as more tax academics weigh in,
it's clear that there's a consensus that this is an issue worthy of
legislative action .... [E]veryone agrees that there's a case for reform.
And this isn't a bunch of lightweights; nor is it a group that generally
believes in higher taxes, or more redistribution. We tend to believe in a
broader base and lower rates, and that's one way of viewing carried
interest reform. There are really few academic voices in dissent ....
TaxProf Blog, The Academic Consensus on Carried Interest (Aug. 1, 2007),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/2007/08/the-academic-co.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2008).
15On October 3, 2007, the New York Times published an interview with Professor
Fleischer in which Fleischer briefly explained his view of the problem with the taxation of
profit interests and how the law should be changed to correct that problem. Andrew Ross
Sorkin, A Professor's Word on the Buyout Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, available at
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/03/a-professors-word-on-the-buyout-battle/.
An online reader, perhaps picking up on Fleischer's suggestion that someone would accuse
him of not understanding the real world, argued in response that academicians were "totaly
[sic] out of touch with reality." Id. (comment 4).
16See infra Act
II.
" 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
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existing. Diamond and its aftermath provide the first evidence of
successful rent-seeking behavior in the tax code with regard to the taxation
of profit interests. The case expressed before-the-fact agreement with
Fleischer's proposal.' 8 Indeed, the legal outcome initially confirmed that
rent-seeking would not prevail over sound tax policy. 19 Surprisingly, that
is if one ignores rational rent-seeking behavior as a determinate of tax law,
the government promptly gave away that confirmation. The give-away
20
was so stark that the judiciary once rejected the government's concession.
When, in a case subsequent to Diamond, the IRS attempted to disavow its
policy-justified victory, that court explicitly rejected the disavowal. 21 Even
in that instance, though, the manner in which the court rejected the rentseeking outcome made possible by the government's attempted disavowal
left open the possibility that rent-seeking would eventually be rewarded.
In Act II, we see how the temporarily diminished hope that rentseeking would determine the resolution of a substantive tax issue
reemerged as the dominant motivator for the rule that prevails to this date.
Rather than seek judicial or what might be referred to as public-law
approval of the implicit agreement between rent-seekers and rentproviders, the government merely entered into a private agreement
whereby sound or at least universally agreed upon tax policy was modified
for political purposes. As Act II will show, the government issued two
revenue procedures that essentially codified the rent-seeking agreement
previously disallowed by the judiciary.
Those revenue procedures
describe, in broad detail, the method by which a small contingency of
financially interested taxpayers, i.e., the partnership tax bar, were
successful in elevating political demands over sound tax policy. The
agreement was very nearly set in stone-via the issuance of still pending
proposed regulations 22 that would have permanently codified its termswhen Professor Fleischer essentially unmasked what seemed like a
legitimate policy compromise," exposing the tax policy costs and financial
8ld. at 286-92.
'9 Id. at 292.
20

Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 818-19 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting

government's attempt to concede that the grant of a profit interest to a partner was not a
taxable event).
21 Id. at 820.
Dep't of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, PartnershipEquity for Services, 70 Fed.
Reg. 29675 (May 24, 2005).
22
23

Professor Howard Abrams, one of the few scholars who support the status quo ante,

argues that the current approach is in fact a reasonable method of achieving the proper
(continued)
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windfalls associated with the rent seeking that actually animated the
agreement. Indeed, there were at least arguable policy reasons that might
have been asserted by objective, disinterested persons in support of the
current arrangement. Those policy assertions, though, have since been
disproven or overcome and are not even relied upon, in disguise of rentseeking or rent extraction, by those who have successfully prevented
substantive reform.
In Act III, the Article describes one legislative reform proposal to
correct the taxation of profit interests, as well as the policy arguments
offered in opposition to the proposal. Those arguments were useful only as
tools to disguise the otherwise blatant demands for rent or rent extraction.
That is, the forces that came together to defeat reform in the short term
were initially depicted as holding opposing views, when in reality they
worked together for their mutual benefit.
One side preserved its
government subsidy, while the other extracted rents in exchange for that
preservation. The policy arguments offered in opposition to reform are
superficially attractive, it should be admitted, but none of them withstand
critical or even scant scrutiny. One can only conclude that even those who
purportedly agreed with the need for reform did so only as part of a larger
effort to extract rents from those who stood to lose from the enactment of
that reform.
Act IV introduces a recently articulated theory known as the "reverse
Mancur Olson phenomenon., 24 Mancur Olson posited collective political
action as essentially a process whereby special interest groups identify
threats to, or opportunities for government funded, "non-market" returns
and then, in the form of lobbyists, prey upon legislators who must either
continue or grant the subsidy, or risk losing financial support useful for
remaining in or achieving higher office.2 5 Under this widely respected
theory, legislators are victim rather than perpetrator and eventually make
tax determinations based on money and the desire to maintain incumbency.
Two recent scholars have challenged the conventional political theory,
though, that special interest groups form exclusively in response to or in
pursuit of government subsidies referred to in economic literature as

result. Abrams, supra note 6, at 188 ("[T]he current system of taxation, though based on

administrative convenience, ultimately reaches what is close to a proper result. And it is
hard, both practically and conceptually, to draft a broad rule that reaches a better one.").
24 Edward

J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic
of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1159, 1164 (2006).
25

Id.at 1172-73, (citing MCCHESNEY, supra note 13, at 45).
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"rent., 2 6 These scholars assert that savvy legislators themselves identify
opportunities for rent extraction when they become cognizant of threats to
existing rents or opportunities to create new rents.27 The reverse Mancur
Olsen theory asserts that legislators turn the tables on interest groups by
using the threat of lost or denied rent to provoke the formation of special
interest groups and then extract financial benefits from the groups in
exchange for the continuation or grant of rents to the group. 28 It is
sometimes thought that special interest groups, formed rather
spontaneously in response to Fleischer's whistle-blowing activity,
descended upon legislators and successfully blocked the legal reform that
would have deprived them of the non-market returns offered by taxation of
profit interests. In Act IV, the Article demonstrates how the reverse
Mancur Olsen phenomenon worked to successfully thwart the substantive
reform called for by Fleischer. As one scholar noted, the reforms were
best characterized as a "no-brainer," meaning that having sufficiently
identified the problem's cost, the effectuation of a solution was a simple
matter of quick, easy, uncontroversial legislative action. 29 The best
evidence of the reverse Mancur Olsen effect, though, came in the form of
unexpected alliances between legislators who usually oppose what they
view as untoward tax benefits for wealthy taxpayers (i.e., populistsounding Democrats) and legislators who usually oppose redistributive
policies embodied in progressive tax rates (i.e., free market sounding
Republicans). 30 The reverse Mancur Olsen phenomenon occurred in
almost precisely the manner described by the theory's proponents to
effectively turn a "no-brainer" into a controversial measure destined for
exile.
26McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 24. "Rent" refers to "non-market" economic returns

that 27one economic actor pays to or extracts from another party. Id. at 1172.
1d. at 1172-73.
28
id.
29 Professor Mark Gergen has referred to the necessary fix as a "no-brainer" in informal
settings. His more formal articulation states, "There is a fairly simple solution to the
problem of the taxation of carried interests: amend Section 702(b) to treat a partner's
distributive share as ordinary income when the partner receives the distributive share as
compensation for services rendered by the partner to the partnership." Hearing on Fair
and Equitable Tax Policy for America's Working Families Before the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 11 0th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2007) (Statement of Mark P. Gergen, Professor
of Law, The University of Texas School of Law, Austin, Texas), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.govihearings.asp?formmode=view&id=6433.
30 See infra Act IV.
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The Epilogue suggests that even despite our penchant for rent-seeking
or rent-extraction, tax policy may eventually prevail. To the faithful, rentseeking and rent-extraction are annual, though temporary, phenomena that
hardly ever outlast fundamental policy. Truth yet prevails. There is reason
for hope if this be true. This might especially be the case with regard to
the taxation of profit interests because the status quo ante with respect to
the taxation of profit interests arguably threatens the rents provided to a
larger group of rent seekers and rent extractors. So long as profit-interests
are taxed at capital gains rates, there exist reasons to question whether
capital gains rates, themselves, are ever truly justifiable as a policy
grounds. The uneasy political compromise that animate preferential capital
gains rates is undermined by the grant of such rates to service providers in
receipt of profit interests. As pointed out by the proponents of the reverse
Mancur Olson phenomenon, the existence of one rent may threaten the
existence of another, thereby generating a contest between two groups of
rent seekers or rent extractors. Only one can prevail. The epilogue
predicts that the taxation of profit interests will eventually be reformed
because those who benefit from the grant of rents via preferential capital
gains will command more allegiance than those who support the
preferential taxation of profit interests. There will be vindication for
Professor Fleischer after all, though more for political than tax policy
reasons.
31

ACT I: DIAMOND V. COMMISSIONER

Diamond serves more to exemplify fundamental tax policy than it does
the rent-seeking or rent-extraction that underlies present law. It may be,
though, that rent seeking occurred at a less organized level prior to
Diamond.32 The literature suggests that the practicing bar intentionally
eschewed careful tax analysis-which would have resulted in the
recognition of ordinary income either upon grant of the profit interest or
when amounts were paid with respect to the profit interest. 33 Instead, the

31492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
32 See,

e.g., Craig E. Cammock, Comment, The Effect of Revenue Procedure93-27 on

Taxation of Partnership Profit Interests Received in Exchange for Services, 30
L. REV. 791, 794 (1994) ("Prior to the decision in Diamond v.
Commissioner... the Service and the tax bar reached a consensus that the receipt of a
profits interest in exchange for services constituted a nontaxable event.").
33 Carolyn S. Nachmias, Using Profits to Compensate a Service Provider-Potential
PartnershipCharacterization,21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1125, 1138-44 (1994) (regarding the
(continued)
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universal advice, given primarily to executives upon receipt of essentially
incentive compensation for services, was that the compensation would and
should be taxed only upon receipt of yields from the profit interest. 34 The
presumptively ordinary rates that should have applied to those yields were
apparently of no concern to the bar. 35 Indeed, the government never
challenged this advice until Sol Diamond's rather conspicuous attempt to
accelerate the conversion of his ordinary income into capital gains.
The taxpayer in Diamond forced explicit consideration of the tax
outcome that prevails today. Sol Diamond epitomizes the meaning of
"service partner." In Diamond, one partner contributed $78,000 to a
partnership. 36 Sol Diamond, a mortgage broker, contributed no capital but
agreed to arrange financing for the venture.37 He was successful in
arranging a loan for $1,100,000 and, as compensation, was granted a
vested right to share in 60% of the future profits from the operation of the
partnership. 38 Thus, in addition to exemplifying a classic "service partner,"
Diamond also demonstrated what is meant by the phrase "profit interest."
His due consisted of an inchoate right to share in profits from capital
owned by another partner. 39 In fundamental terms, Sol received immediate
or future compensation for services, 40 depending on timing principals
discussed in Act II. The Service did not argue for immediate income
exclusion; 4 1 indeed, it might never have even reacted to the arrangement
had not Diamond sought to sell his profit interest for $40,000 a mere few
weeks later. Diamond effectuated the sale, reporting $40,000 short term
capital gain 42 and thereby forced the issue that plagues the tax code today.
The fundamental tax policy objection in Diamond was that a laborer
had performed services for a capitalist, generating income for that
consensus amongst commentators that receipt of profit interest was not a taxable event
despite the lack of authority for that consensus).
34
1d. at 1139 n.87.
35 Id. at 1138 n.81 (citing Jules I. Whitman, How a Partner Whose Primary
Contribution Is Services May Achieve CapitalGain, 22 N.Y.U. INST. OF FED. TAX'N 653,
663-64 (1964).
36 Diamond,492 F.2d at 287.
37
Id. at 286.
38
id.
39
1Id. at 287.
40 See Treas. Reg. 1.61-2(d) (2003) (regarding the receipt of compensation in a form
other than cash); see also Diamond,492 F.2d at 286-87.
41Diamond,492 F.2d at 287, 290.
42 Id. at 287.

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[36:853

capitalist presently or in the future.43 Settled tax law, of course, determines
that service compensation is to be taxed at ordinary rates and that
compensation may occur as the result of the payment of cash, property, or
even other services. 44 Economically, Diamond was no different from any
other laborer and yet through use of a partnership he was able to convert
ordinary income into capital gains. The result would have been consistent
with tax policy if, indeed, Diamond actually occupied the status of those
intended to be benefited by capital gains taxation.
The latter point requires brief considerations of the policy justifications
underlying capital gains taxation. Tax rates have always been progressive,
though the rate of progressivity has varied over the history of the tax
code.45 As taxpayers earn more, they are expected as a matter of
distributive justice pay a higher percentage of their income as taxes.46 The
rates set on income from capital however cut against this pattern. Under
current rates for example, income from labor is taxed at marginal rates as
high as 35%,47 while an identical amount of income from capital is
normally taxed at rates as high as only 15%.48 Some proponents consider
this disparate treatment regressive and thus patently unfair. 49 Still, there
are elegant policy theories in support of the disparate treatment and, if
accepted, lead to the conclusion that social utility increases when tax on
yields from capital are decreased even while tax on income from labor is
not.
Thus, if Sol Diamond's partner-the partner who contributed capitalhad sold a small interest in the partnership to a third party for $40,000, it
would have been perfectly consistent with accepted tax policy for him to
have reported the yield as capital gain, taxed at 15% by today's rates.
Diamond's gain arose purely from his labor and thus should have been
taxed as ordinary income, up to 35% by today's rates. The disparity seems
all the more inequitable if we assume that Diamond's partner is much
43 Id. at 288.

44 Id. at 290 (noting that the Tax Commissioner asserted delinquencies when a partner

tax payer had not reported the market value of a profit share in ordinary income).
45 See generally Vada Waters Lindsey, The Widening Gap Under the Internal Revenue
Code: The Needfor Renewed Progressivity,5 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 7-12 (2001).
46 Id.

41 I.R.C. § I(a)-(e) (LexisNexis 2008).
48 Id.

§ 1(h). While some capital gains are taxed at 25 or 28%, most are taxed at 15%.

See id. § l(h)(l)(C).
49 Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah Schenk, The Casefor a CapitalGains Preference,
48 TAX L. REV. 319, 321 (1993).
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wealthier than Diamond. In the absence of sufficient justification, the tax
law ought to eliminate the disparate treatment.
The three traditional reasons for the capital gains preference-reasons
that are important to the tax treatment of profit interests-include the
desire to avoid (1) tax on "phantom gain" or double taxation on the same
These three
income, (2) the "lock-in" effect, and (3) bunching.50
outcomes, and their inapplicability to Sol Diamond, are best demonstrated

by an example. Suppose Diamond's partner earned $100, after taxes,
during a period when annual inflation was 10%. Assume further a constant
tax rate of 15% for income less than $30.00 and 30% for income over
$30.00. If Diamond's partner invest his $100 in the partnership and more
than one year later sells the partnership interest for $110, he will be treated
as though he has a $10 accession to wealth. His tax will be $1.50. As a
result of inflation, however, Diamond has no more purchasing or
consumption power on the date of the sale than he had on the date of the
investment. His nominal gain is illusory, at best, and it will be as if
Diamond were taxed a second time on the identical $100.5 l He would have
been better off had he immediately consumed the $100 invested in the
partnership.
The second reason for the capital gains preference-lock in-is closely
related to the first and third justification. The taxation of mere inflationary
gain discourages divestment when perhaps it would be economically
rational and socially useful to divest.5 2 Suppose, for example, that
Diamond's partner invested in an oil and gas partnership but after five
years realized that moving his investment to renewable energy sources
would be preferable. Upon that realization, he might sell his investment
and use the proceeds to invest in renewable energy sources. If he did so,
however, he would face two negative consequences. First, he would have
to pay taxes on the gain from his divestment. The desire to avoid taxes on
divestment acts as a disincentive to divestment (and reinvestment) and thus
creates the "lock-in" effect. Second, the sale of the asset after five years,
"bunches" all of the appreciation as taxable gain into year six.53 Thus,
Diamond's partner would have $61.05 in nominal gain in year six that
would be taxed at 30% since his annual income would exceed $30. His tax
liability would be $18.31; had the appreciation been taxed as it accrued (at
' 0 1d. at
5'Id. at
52 Id. at
53Id.at

319, 325, 328, 344.
337-40 (regarding the taxation of inflation).
344-49 (regarding the lock-in effect).
328-30 (regarding the bunching effect).

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[36:853

a rate of 10% per year), the aggregate tax liability over the same five year
period would have been only $9.16. The bunching effect caused a nearly
twofold increase in tax liability.
Lowering the rate of tax, as occurs via a capital gains preference,
provides Diamond with "rough justice" because with any given asset it is
nearly impossible to determine the portion of its appreciation attributable
to inflation and the portion attributable to real increase in consumption
power. Likewise, we cannot know for sure the precise impact of the lockin or bunching effects. In any event, the theories are elegant enough to
provide us with enough reason to conclude that the benefit of disparate
treatment of yields from capital and yield from labor outweigh the apparent
unfairness.
The same conclusion cannot be made with respect to the grant of
capital gains preference to Sol Diamond. The first assumption upon which
the capital gains preference rests is that the financial capital invested in the
partnership was previously taxed at ordinary rates at least once prior to its
investment. Sol Diamond's invested human rather financial capital; there
was no previous instance of taxation at any rate because the tax code does
not levy human capital itself There is no phantom gain/double taxation
problem with respect to yields from human capital. There is also neither a
lock-in nor bunching effect because there has been no previous investment
of previously taxed income. Thus, granting a tax preference to Sol
Diamond would serve no useful purpose to justify the unfairness that
would exist as between Sol Diamond and any other service provider.
The tax bar might have been perfectly content to take their winnings
from pre-Diamond transactions had the Tax Court simply ruled that the
grant of a profit interest was not an appropriate occasion to impose a tax,
but any yields later realized from that grant should be taxed as ordinary
income, at least to the extent of the value of the services giving rise to the
profit interest. As explained above, the biggest danger to the tax code
arising from Sol Diamond's strategy was the improper treatment of
ordinary income as capital gains. Instead of focusing on the point at which
conversion occurred-Diamond's sale of the profit interest-the Tax
Court, no doubt in response to the government's apparently sensible logic,
ruled that the grant of the profit interest was itself an event appropriate for
taxation at ordinary rates. 54 This conclusion successfully thwarted the
conversion of service income to capital income but at the same time it
threatened to upset the status quo ante. Profit interests were relatively rare
54 Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
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devices used, specifically, to provide deferred compensation for highly
paid executives.55 Diamond threatened that strategy not because it
incorrectly diagnosed the problem-conversion of ordinary income to
capital gain-but because it incorrectly treated the problem. Conversion
was, at that time, a fortuitous benefit with which the tax bar seemed
unconcerned.56 The significant, intended benefit was instead deferral of
tax liability. 57 Diamond's treatment of the profit interest as a taxable event
prevented conversion but also threatened the significant tax benefit most
profit interest recipients sought.
ACT II: RENT SEEKING AND REVENUE PROCEDURES

The tax bar's universally negative reaction to Diamond was swift and
unequivocal. It manifested itself in two ways. The first might legitimately
be described as an unstated conspiracy to simply ignore Diamond's
holding that the grant of a profit interest constituted a taxable event. 58

Instead, practitioners continued to advise taxpayers that there were no
immediate tax consequences from the grant of a profit interest. The second
involved the pursuit of an essentially sub rosa agreement with the
government that would reinstate the non-taxability of profit interests in a
more formal manner than a simple wink and a nod. 59 The bar was helped
55See Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service Partners, 48
TAx L. REV. 69, 84-88 (1992) (regarding the grant of a profit interest as deferred

compensation); see also Cammock, supra note 32, at 791 ("Many high-bracket taxpayers
have effectively deferred recognition of income by rendering services to a partnership in
exchange for a nontaxable interest in future partnership profits.").
56Diamond, 492 F.2d. at 289-90.
57Id. at 290. Indeed, deferral is normally accompanied by a lower tax rate. This is
because the deferred income can be paid to the recipient at a time of his or her selection,
normally during a tax year when the recipient is in a lower tax bracket.
58 Arnold W. Martens, The Mark IV Pictures Decision Offers No Guidancefor the Tax
Advisor, Only More Confusion, 38 S.D. L. REV. 641, 660 ("A series of cases and a general
counsel memorandum gave support to the pre-Diamondbelief that the issue with respect to
services exchanged for a profits interest in a partnership could be ignored. Tax advisors
based this belief on the theory that the profits interest had no current ascertainable value.").
591 refer to the government's resolution as a "sub rosa" agreement because it was
implemented by way of revenue procedures. See supra notes 22 & 23 and accompanying
text. Revenue Procedures are essentially means by which the Internal Revenue Services
("the Service") instructs taxpayers how they should report a tax position. Rev. Proc. 89-14,
1989-1 C.B. 814 ("A 'revenue procedure' is an official statement of a procedurepublished
in the Bulletin that either affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the
public under the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes, treaties, and regulations or,
(continued)
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along in both pursuits by the government's almost immediate disavowal of
its own victory in Diamond.60 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed Diamond in 197461 and by the end of 1975 the Treasury
Department had already suggested on two separate occasions that the
holding be ignored.6 2
Actually, there were legitimate reasons why Diamond might have been
overruled by statute or authorized regulations in a more considered and
deliberate manner. The key fact upon which the tax bar relied prior to
Diamond was the asserted inability to correctly value the profit interest.63
Sol Diamond's sale of his profit interest less than three months after he
received it contradicted the notion that the interest could not be objectively
valued. The Tax Court simply assumed that the value of the profit interest
on the date it was sold must have been equal to the value of that interest on
the date Sol Diamond received it. 64 In pursuit of its decision to ignore
Diamond's holding, the tax bar nevertheless argued that the facts of that
case were sui generis and extraordinarily unlikely to reoccur. 65 The rather
obvious fallacy in the assertion that profit interests are incapable of
valuation is that the parties themselves have assigned a value via arms
length negotiation. Laborers do not usually work for free, nor do capitalist
expect free service. The parties themselves know the value of the profit
interest because one has used it to obtain needed services and the other has
accepted the interest in lieu of the cash value of her services. The
although not necessarily affecting the rights and duties of the public, should be a matter of
public knowledge.") (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the revenue procedures had the effect
of substantive authority because they essentially announced that the Service would not
challenge taxpayers who took positions contrary to the holding in Diamond
60 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975) (recommending for a
third time that
the government not follow the holding in Diamond).
6 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
62 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975). See also Laura E. Cunningham,
Taxing PartnershipInterests Exchangedfor Services, 47 TAX L. REV. 247,250 (1991).
63 See, e.g., FEDERAL TAXATION COMMITtEE, CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT

OF

SUGGESTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVELY ADDRESSING THE UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY THE

TCM 236 (1990) (Feb. 1991), available
via Lexis at 91 TNT 58-35 (arguing that a rule requiring recognition of income upon grant
of profit interest created severe valuation problems); SECTION ON TAXATION, Los ANGELES
TAX COURT DECISION IN WILLIAM G. CAMPBELL, 59

COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMENTS ON THE TAXATION OF THE RECEIPT OF A PROFITS

PARTNERSHIP INTEREST FOR SERVICES (May 1991), available via Lexis at 91 TNT 130-26

(same).
64Diamond,492 F.2d. at 288.
65Martens, supra note 58, at 659.

2008]

REVERSE MANCUR OLSON PHENOMENON

valuation problem is illusory, at best, and therefore should not as the basis
for delaying taxation.66
Even assuming, as logic ultimately dictates, that a profit interest is
capable of valuation, there is still one legitimate reason why the ability to
value the interest does not require immediate taxation. It is generally
assumed that valuation, per se, requires the imposition of tax liability.67
Indeed, the receipt of something valuable, particularly that which is
bargained for, ought normally to result in taxation. Value, though, is not
invariably synonymous with income. Income is not an objective construct
such that we can determine its occurrence from the ability to value
something. "Income" as it is used in tax jurisprudence embodies the
notion that it is presently appropriate to demand that the recipient pay a
tax. 68 Hence, valuation is merely one aspect of the larger concept of
"income." That concept includes administrative convenience, as in the
case of withholding tax on appreciation until that appreciation is actually
realized to avoid the administrative burden of determining the exact value
of that appreciation. 69 It also takes into account liquidity, the desire to
avoid forced divestment and, in fact, the right to plan transaction
specifically to defer taxation.70 All of these considerations recently
determined, for example, that a baseball fan who suddenly found himself
in possession of record-setting baseball indisputably worth $3 million
dollars did not have income immediately. 71 Though that which the fan

66

Cf Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(iii) (2008) ("Only in those rare and extraordinary

cases involving sales for a contingent payment obligation in which the fair market value of
the obligation (determinable under the preceding sentences) cannot reasonably be
ascertained will the taxpayer be entitled to assert that the transaction is 'open."').
67 84 C.J.S. Taxation According to Value § 73 (2001).
68 2 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. 6001 (CCH 2008).
69 See I.R.C. § 1001 (LexisNexis 2008); Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S.
554, 559 (1991) ("As this Court has recognized, the concept of realization is 'founded on
administrative convenience.' Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940). Under an
appreciation-based system of taxation, taxpayers and the Commissioner would have to
undertake the 'cumbersome, abrasive, and unpredictable administrative task' of valuing
assets on an annual basis to determine whether the assets had appreciated or depreciated in
value.").
70 KEvIN E. MURPHY, CONCEPTS IN FEDERAL TAXATION 29-30 (1996).
71See Lawrence Zelenak & Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Taxing Baseballs and Other Found
Property, 84 TAX NOTES 1299, 1300-01 (1999) (regarding the IRS' decision not to impose a
tax on the fan who caught Mark McGwire's record setting baseball).
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obtained was capable of valuation, it need not have been taken into account
until the property's easily determined value had been converted.
The same considerations better support postponing a tax levy upon the
receipt of a profit interest than does the assertion that a profit interest is
incapable of valuation. Clearly, the profit interest is capable of valuation,
but requiring immediate payment of taxes would encourage premature
divestment and infringe upon the taxpayer's delicate right to plan the
occurrence of income to her own advantage. Valuation is simply not a
sufficient reason to postpone taxation because there are very few things, if
any, that cannot be valued to a reasonable degree of certainty.
It is probably because valuation is not an insurmountable problem in
any event that the tax bar remained so concerned even as the government
was willing to concede the bar's uncritical advice that the grant of a profit
interest did not result in immediate taxation. Nearly twenty years after
Diamond, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, mistakenly conflating
valuation and income, determined in Campbell v. Commissioner7 2 that the
73
grant of a profit interest capable of valuation was indeed a taxable event.
If that were true, the bar must have realized, nearly every grant of a profit
interest would be a taxable event. It would be a mere matter of time before
the valuation fallacy would be exposed.
The tax bar's repeated assertions that it lacked understandable
authority regarding the taxation of profit interest most likely resulted
instead from the realization that the precedents were all too clear. It was
after Campbell v. Commissioner that the bar came to understand that the
non-market returns (i.e., rent) were in serious jeopardy.74 Read together,
Diamond and Campbell represent the rather uncomplicated rule that the
ability to value a profit interest means immediate taxation is appropriate
and indeed required. The bar's assertions were profitable to the extent they
persuaded the government to join in what seems like a feigned confusion
regarding valuation capabilities. In Revenue Procedure 93-27, 75 the
government restated the simple, though substantively incorrect proposition
that the inability to value a profit interest requires that the grant of the
profit interest results in immediate taxation. The concession to the bar,
though, came in the procedure's extraordinarily narrow limits on the
circumstances in which a profit interest would be deemed capable of
72

73

943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 1991).

d. at 823.

74 See Abrams, supra note 6, at 183 & n.2.
75Rev. Rul. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
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valuation. The procedure essentially limits valuation capability to profits
interest that "relates to a substantially certain and predictable stream of
income from partnership assets" or a profit interest that is disposed of
within two years of receipt.7 6 The latter instance presumably refers to a
situation such as in Diamond where the taxpayer sold the profit interest
soon enough after its receipt that the sale price could easily be used as a
market valuation of the interest on the date it was granted. Ultimately, the
tax bar obtained the return to pre-Diamondlaw it desperately sought.77
Significantly, Revenue Procedure 93-27 applies only when profit
interests were granted to a person providing services "in a partner capacity
or in anticipation of becoming a partner., 7 8 What it failed to address was
the characterization of amounts later paid with respect to the profit interest.
Under IRC 702(b), items taxable to the partners are characterized at the
partnership level.79 If the partnership realizes capital gain and allocates a
portion to the service partner in accordance with her profit interest, what
will have started as compensation, taxed as ordinary income, will be
converted to capital gain. That possibility was never addressed in Revenue
Procedure 93-27, but in Revenue Procedure 2001-43,8o the government
essentially mandated that outcome. Revenue Procedure 2001-43 requires,
as a condition of maintaining the non-taxability of the profit interest, that
the recipient be treated as a partner from the date of the grant. 8' Thus,
amounts paid with respect to profit interest would be paid to a "partner"
and thus characterized at the partnership level under IRC 702(b). Here,
then, was an additional opportunity for rent-seeking behavior. Not only
could a taxpayer structure her compensation so as to defer tax liability, and
quite properly so, but she could also have that compensation taxed as
though it represented earnings from property rather than services.
ACT III: THREATS TO FUND MANAGER RENTS
Administrative convenience is the overriding policy concern in
Revenue Procedures 93-27 and 2001-43.82 The tax code, Subchapter K
76

Id. at 344. In addition, if the partnership in which a profit interest is granted is a

publicly traded partnership, the grant of profit interest will result in immediate taxation. Id.
77 Simon Friedman, PartnershipCapital Accounts and Their Discontents, 2 N.Y.U.

J.L. & Bus. 791, 799 (2005).
78Rev. Rul. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. at 344.
79I.R.C. § 702(b) (LexisNexis 2008).
80 Rev. Rul. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191.
81 Id.
82

See Abrams, supra note 6, at 186.
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especially, often sacrifices tax accuracy for the sake of administrative
convenience. 83 In some instances, the benefit of achieving the precisely
correct outcome is viewed as not worth the corresponding administrative
burden. 84 The lost revenue from intentional inaccuracy is thought to be
less than the cost of getting to the most accurate outcome. 85 There would
be very little burden, though, associated with requiring the parties to
divulge the market value of services and then taxing that amount as
ordinary income. As rational economic actors, the parties would have
determined the value of the services provided in any event.
Thus, the two revenue procedures implicitly overstate the cost of tax
accuracy. They assume administrative difficulty with respect to the
valuation of profit interests and, as a result, tolerate an uncertain amount of
revenue loss under the assumption that the revenue loss is never greater
than the costs associated with a rule requiring valuation and immediate
taxation.
This section shows that while the costs associated with
administrative burdens of accuracy were overstated, the lost revenue from
intentional inaccuracy was greatly understated. Once those burdens and
lost revenue were accurately measured, the Congress initiated corrective
action that, in turn, led to the occurrence of the reverse Mancur Olson
phenomenon, discussed in Act IV.
As noted earlier, the enduring assumption regarding profit interests is
that the difficulty in valuing those interests justifies postponing taxation
until profits are actually paid. In Act II, the Article discounted the
valuation difficulty but nevertheless agreed for different reasons that
taxation should be delayed until amounts are actually paid. The assumed
cost of accurately taxing profit interests were thought to be higher than the
revenue losses from intentional inaccuracy. In fact, the revenue procedures
are based on the assumption that the revenue loss is usually nil. Both
rulings treat the grant and receipt of a profit interest as a closed transaction

83 Cf

Treas. Reg. 1.701-2(a)(3) (1995) ("[C]ertain provisions of subchapter K and the

regulations thereunder were adopted to promote administrative convenience and other
policy objectives, with the recognition that the application of those provisions to a
transaction could, in some circumstances, produce tax results that do not properly reflect
income.").
84 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 77, at 799-801 (discussing 2005 changes to Treasury
regulation sections 1.704-1(b) and 1.704-2 that highlights high burden of compliance
against risk of incorrect outcomes).
85 Id.
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86
as of the date of the grant where the value of the compensation is zero.
Doing so means that future payments are taxed as though they are entirely
unrelated to the services but instead derived from partnership's activities.
Treating the grant and receipt of the profit interest as a closed transaction
requires a determination that the amount of compensation paid to the
service partner is zero--a conclusion that belies rationality since people do
not bargain their labor away for nothing. If the compensation is zero then
the expense incurred by the service recipient must also be zero; if it is
assumed that all parties to the transaction are taxed at the same rate the
revenue loss must also be zero because the trade or business expense
deduction87 for compensation must equal the amount included by the
service provider as gross income. Thus, the government loses tax revenue
when it allows a service provider to forego inclusion but essentially
recoups that lost revenue by denying an equal deduction to the service
Even if the govemment had accurately determined that
recipients.
valuation costs were insignificant it would still have reason to conclude
that the valuation costs exceeded the loss revenue because the lost revenue
would almost always be zero.
In early 2006, Professor Victor Fleischer wrote what might
legitimately be characterized as the academic equivalent of a media
expose. 88 Using typical contract terms found in hedge, private equity and
venture capital fund governing documents, Fleischer showed how the
nearly forty year old expedient compromise regarding the taxation of profit
interests had come to exemplify an incredibly inefficient and inequitable
His article initiated a long overdue
"loophole" in the tax code. 89

86

Under the "liquidation method" the value of the compensation is equal to the value of

the amount of assets the service partner would receive if the partnership liquidated
immediately after grant of the profit interest. Since upon grant of the profit interest the
service partner receives only the right to receive future unearned profits, the value of her
liquidation rights on the date of the grant must be zero. See Cunningham, supra note 62, at
255.
87 I.R.C. § 162 (LexisNexis 2008).
88

See Fleischer, supra note 4. See also Taxing Private Equity, supra note 4, at 846

(noting the media and popular attention given to Fleischer's article); Thomas Brennan &
Karl S. Okamoto, Measuring The Tax Subsidy in Private Equity and Hedge Fund
Compensation (Drexel College of Law Research Paper No. 2008-W-01), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid = 1082943.
89 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 17-26.
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discussion, provoked at least three Congressional hearings, 90 two
legislative proposals, 9' and the publication of several more articles
exploring the taxation of profit interests.92 Fleischer's article and his call
for reform generated more study and debate regarding the taxation of profit
interests during the past two years then occurred during the previous forty
years. Ultimately, though, it was tax politics rather than tax policy that
determined the short term resolution of the conversion of ordinary income
to capital gains through the use of subchapter K.
The intricate details of fund manager compensation are thoroughly
explored in Flesicher's article and the many more that were published in
response to his article.93 The general details suffice for purposes of the
present discussion. What hedge and private equity funds have in common
are that they are usually organized as limited partnerships. 94 The limited
partners obligate themselves to contribute investment capital, while the
95
general partner agrees to provide investment management services.
Typically, the limited partners agree to compensate the general partner via
the "two and twenty." "Two" refers to a fixed fee equal to two percent of
the invested capital. 96 "Twenty" refers to a variable payment equal to
twenty percent of the partnership gains derived from the investments
selected and managed by the general partner.9 7 As noted earlier, by having
the compensation flow through the partnership, fund managers are able to
convert compensation income, taxed at rates up to 35%, into capital gains
90 Both the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate

held hearings during summer 2007 regarding the topic.

See Hearing on Fair and

Equitable Tax Policy for America's Working Families Before the H. Comm. on Ways
and Means, 1I0th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2007), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=584; CarriedInterest, Part II: Hearing Before the

United States Senate Comm. on Fin., 10th Cong. (July 31, 2007), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing073107.htm; United States Senate, Committee
on Finance, CarriedInterest, Part I: Hearing Before the United States Senate Comm. on
Fin., 110th Cong. (July 11, 2007), available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/
hearing071107.htm.
9' H.R. 2834, 11 0th Cong. (2007); S. 1624, 11 0th Cong. (2007).

Private Equity, supra note 4, at 859.
92 E.g., Taxing Private Equity, supra note 4, at 846.
93 See Fleischer, supra note 4; see also supra note 12.
94 See Fleischer, supra note 4, at 8.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 3.
97 Id.

See also Taxing
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taxed at rates up to 15%.98 Fleischer argues, quite correctly, that none of
the traditional reasons for granting the capital gains preference applies to
fund manager compensation.99 He considers five proposals for reform but
ultimately settles upon changing the law so that yields from profit interest
are simply taxed as ordinary income. 00
The most significant point arising from Fleischer's work concerned the
comparison between administrative burden and revenue loss. As noted
above, the assumption underlying Revenue Procedures 93-27 and 2001-43
was that the substantive inaccuracy of treating yields from profit interest
instead as yields from the partnership's invested capital cost the
government very little, if anything.' 0' The revenue lost by not requiring
the inclusion of ordinary income upon grant of the deduction is perfectly
offset, assuming service provider and service recipients are subject to the
same tax rates on their ordinary income, by the increased revenue derived
from denying the a trade or business expense deduction to the service
Fleischer's research virtually shattered the comforting
recipients.
assumption that there were no net losses from the substantive inaccuracy.
Most of the largest investors in pooled funds were indifferent, either
because they were tax exempt, such as universities and pension funds, or2
0
could not have benefited from the denied tax deduction in any event.
Scholars who took these facts into consideration estimated the revenue loss
from the substantive inaccuracy at amounts as high as $4.2 billion per
year. 3
In remarkably short order, both the U.S. House of Representatives and
the Senate saw the introduction of bills that would reform the taxation of
profit interests in the manner Fleischer proposed. 0 4 Initially, the bills were
received as relatively uncontroversial measures that would restore

98 See supra Act II.

99 Fleischer, supra note 4.

'oo Id. at 47-54 (outlining proposals), 57-58 (discussing ordinary income method as

preferred policy recommendation).
See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
101
102 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 17-18.
103 See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests:

Estimatingthe Revenue Effects of Taxing ProfitsInterests as OrdinaryIncome, available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/172/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
104 H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007).
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horizontal equity and intellectual integrity in the tax code.,0 5 There were
complaints regarding added complexity and drafting suggestions, as with
any legislation designed to implement a general policy determination, but
there were no significant protests against the substantive idea of somehow
requiring the application of ordinary rates to the yield from profit
interests.0 6 As it became apparent, though, that fund managers were really
on the verge of losing a substantial tax subsidy, both legislators and
lobbyists resolved their free-rider and organizational problems and
mobilized themselves in an ultimately successful effort to defeat the
proposal. 10 7 The result was the probably starkest, most fascinating
example of the reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon since the articulation of
that theory.
ACT IV: THE REVERSE MANCUR OLSON "SHAKEDOWN"

Conventional wisdom suggests that Congress' failure to correct the tax
treatment of profit interests resulted from the inexorable pressure of
primarily one small special interest group, namely, the group of investment
fund managers. 10 8 This view would portray legislators as unwilling
victims, along with the public, of purely self-interested but very well
funded taxpayers who had no qualms about subordinating the tax code's
logical integrity to their own greedy desires.'0 9 Conventional wisdom is
comforting, in fact, because it restores some sense of "right" to those
scholars who vainly and in quiet academic voice argued in support of
reforms so clearly consistent with fundamental tax policy. The notion that
scholars advocating reform are substantively wrong, particularly because
they are out of touch with the "real world," is not only extraordinarily
discomforting, it also calls into question one's very reason for existing. To
conclude instead that politics and money corrupted and then thwarted
reform, about which there is academic consensus, is an easier pill.
Two scholars, Professors Edward McCaffery and Linda Cohen,
recently made significant contribution to conventional wisdom by coining
and explaining the "reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon."" 0 Mancur
105 See, e.g., Hearing on Fair and Equitable Tax Policy for America's Working

Families Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, Sept. 6, 2007, available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=7144.
106 See id
107See infra Act IV.
108

McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 24, at 1161-62.

109Id.at 1165.

ld.at 1164.
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Olson's famous exposition on political science posits that small groups
become cognizant of opportunities for "non-market returns," overcome
their initial organizational and free-rider problems and, in the words of
McCaffery and Cohen, "descend on Washington and other bastions of
power, in the guise of corporate lobbyists" in successful pursuit of
"rent[s]," the term used to describe those non-market returns."' The
entirety of this process is referred to as "rent-seeking" and essentially
portrays legislators-the gatekeepers of the governmental funds from
which rent is available-as passive objects of prey.' 1 2 McCaffery and
Cohen, implicitly at least, think the notion of rent-seeking as the exclusive13
mode of collective political action is a bit naifve, or at least outdated."
They think instead that legislators are as much predator as prey. Rather
than the passive objects of rent-seeking, legislators are more often
perpetrators of rent-extraction."l 4 In this view, legislators recognize an
opportunity for reaping their own non-market returns in the form of
campaign contributions, stimulate the formation of an interested special
interest group, suggest the possibility of non-market losses via future
legislation, and then "milk" the issue for as long as possible to extract rents
from the interested taxpayers who stand to lose from any particular item of
legislation.
In short, McCaffery and Cohen portray legislators as
extortionist.'115
The reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon is most likely and most
effective, according to McCaffery and Cohen, under three conditions.
First, the group of interested taxpayers must be relatively small, wealthy
and tightly knit."l6 Smaller, well-funded groups with fewer diverging
issues make it easier to avoid collaboration and free-rider problems that
would otherwise prevent the collective rent-seeking action or rentextraction reaction. 17 Second, the issue from which the financial threat
arises should be prolonged as long as possible so legislators can
indefinitely "milk" it for campaign contributions." 8 Third, and perhaps
most significant for the ideal occurrence of the reverse Mancur Olson
l'

Id. at 1161 (citing

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC

GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS

1121d. at 1163-64.
113Id.at 1164.
114Id.

.5 Id.at 1172-74.

16 Id.at 1177.
"'Id.at 1161.
"' Id. at 1178.

(1965)).
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phenomenon, is that there should be at least two diametrically opposed
special interest groups." 9 The presence of at least two groups allows more
legislators to participate in and benefit from rent extraction. It also serves
as a reason for all legislators to cooperate in the indefinite prolonging,
rather than resolution, of the issue raising financial threats.
Each of the three factors identified by McCaffery and Cohen exists
with respect to the efforts to reform the taxation of profit interests. The
most directly interested taxpayers consisted of a very small and wealthy
group of investment fund managers. The taxation of profit interests has
been an unresolved issue for nearly forty years; the issue will likely remain
undecided for several more years at least.
Finally, there at least two groups of wealthy interested taxpayers with
differing positions. Obviously, fund managers seek to maintain the status
quo ante by which their compensation income may be taxed at capital
gains rates. The opposing group most relevant to the occurrence of the
reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon is not so readily identified. Those who
simply object to unexplained preferences in the tax code initially come to
mind. That population, however, is so large and diverse that it can hardly
be referred to as a "special interest group." That population may
ultimately impact the outcome but it is too broadly dispersed to overcome
the coordination and free-rider problems that would make it an effective
group of rent-seekers or an effective target for rent extraction. The group
most likely to serve as "the opposition" and thereby lead to the optimal
conditions for the reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon are taxable investors
who themselves presently enjoy capital gains preferences.
The
justification for the capital gains preference is diluted to the extent the
preference is extended to income having no logical connection to the
traditional rationale for the preference, as is the case when fund manager
returns are granted the preference. Thus, the extension of capital gains
rates to fund managers generates threats to the gains derived by a
separately defined group of taxpayers. The existence of a threatened group
with opposing interests would logically lead to the more financially
productive context for prolonged rent-extraction. Hence, we should
logically assume that the current law with respect to the taxation of profit
interest is the result of the reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon.
A fourth factor, one related more to the ability to predict the
occurrence of the reverse Mancur Olson phenomenon, is the lack of any
logically substantive reason not to impose certain costs on interested
"1 Id. at 1177-78.
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taxpayers. McCaffery and Cohen do not explicitly include this factor as
necessary or predictive of rent extraction but it is logically implicit from
the examples they provide of previous rent extraction behaviors.' 20 The
absence of any reason not to impose the costs of profit interest reform is
best exemplified in the profit interest context by the arguments actually
and unabashedly set forth in response to Fleischer's article and subsequent
legislative proposals. These arguments were essentially that if Congress
actually reformed the law, fund managers would either restructure their
compensation arrangements to nevertheless obtain the conversion which by
that point would be clearly unintended, or would expatriate themselves
from the United States in order to avoid the tax. 12 1 The incredible candor
with which these arguments were made, and the fact that they had no
substantive relationship to the underlying issue-the inequity of applying
lower tax rates to some service providers-implicitly admitted that there
were no legitimate substantive reasons for continuing the status quo.
Clearly, rent extraction is rendered easier when the potential losers have no
substantive argument upon which to rely.
There are many faces of the reverse Mancur Olson "shakedown" but
the most accurate with regard to the efforts to reform the taxation of profit
interest is that of Senator Charles Schumer. 122 Historically, Senator
23
Schumer has argued against what he viewed as regressive tax policies.
The efforts to reform the taxation of profit interest, though, would impact
an admittedly small group, but one largely populated in New York City,
which is represented in Congress by Senator Schumer. Fund managers
represent, within Senator Schumer's immediate proximity, a small,
wealthy, group of taxpayers who stood to lose significant financial
amounts if reform occurred. 124 McCaffery and Cohen emphasize that rentextraction usually follows efforts by legislators to define and then
informally organize the special interest groups from which rents can be
extracted.12 5 Soon after reformers introduced their bill in the House of
"'°Id. at 1175-76.
121See Fleischer, supra note 4, at 49-50, 57.
122For media reports regarding Senator Schumer and his opposition to efforts to reform

the taxation of profit interests see Raymond Hemandez &Stephen Labaton, In Opposing
Tax Plan, Schumer Breaks With Party, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2007, at A1; Jenny Anderson,
For Schumer, The Double-EdgedSword of Cozying Up to Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, June

22, 2007, at C6.
123 Hemandez & Labaton, supra note 122.
Id.
125 McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 24, at 1176.
124
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Representatives, Senator Schumer-ostensibly and ironically for reasons
of "fairness"-sent signals that he was prepared to introduce a bill that
would make it clear that the reform efforts would include other wealthy
and well-defined groups.' 26 As noted by one New York newspaper,
Schumer's threat to introduce a bill that would explicitly extend reform to
oil and gas partnerships seemed like a thinly veiled effort to enlist the
opposition of a powerful interest group.'
McCaffery and Cohen's reverse
Mancur Olson phenomenon would more accurately determine that
Schumer's threat was an effort to define and coordinate another special
interest group from which to extract rents.' 28 It would also prolong
consideration of the efforts, just as McCaffery and Cohen predict in their
initial exposition, thus extending the period over which rents could be
collected.
Ultimately, efforts to reform the taxation of profit interests failed,
despite having initially been welcomed as necessary and long overdue.
The process by which those efforts went from being characterized as "no
brainers" to efforts requiring indefinite and inconclusive consideration and
reconsideration do not speak to the substantive merits as much as they
speak to the influence of rent seeking and rent extraction on tax laws.
Unlike McCaffery and Cohen, though, I am not so prepared to lament this
reality. It is more productive for the moment that stakeholders simply
recognize the reality so that they do not become dispirited in their higher
efforts to at least identify the legitimate policy debates and conclusions that
should inform tax laws. That an effort to find the optimal approaches to
the distribution of tax burdens in society fails to produce concrete
outcomes as a result of politics does not, in itself, prove that the effort was
wrong or those expending the effort are "out of touch" with reality.

126 See Geoff Earle, Chuck Hedges His Bets, N.Y. POST, Aug. 14, 2007,

§ News, at 3
("Charles Schumer has begun drafting legislation that would close a loophole that allows
wealthy hedge-fund managers to get big portions of their earnings taxed at less than half the
rate paid by ordinary taxpayers. But his effort could actually frustrate efforts to end the tax
break. In a move critics say is designed to sink the bill, Schumer wants to make the changes
also apply to oil and gas firms-which would then deploy their lobbying clout to fight the
bill.").
127Id.

128The New York Times reported that Senator Schumer raised more than $1 million
dollars from private equity funds for the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee, of
which Senator Schumer was chair in 2007. See Hernandez & Labaton, supra note 122.
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As of the end of summer 2007, it became very apparent that efforts to
reform the taxation of profit interests had died quietly, proving the triumph
of politics over policy.'1 29 The reality need not be entirely disheartening. It
is only our naYvet6 that makes us believe that tax law, unlike every other
area of law, is or ought to be entirely immune from politics. Discarding
na'vet6 does not also require that we abandon the search for "fundamental
truths" in tax law, if indeed there be any. The prolonged discussion of the
taxation of profit interests, for example, has been useful in the short term
for the identification of the polar opposites along a spectrum of fairness.
That one opposite prevailed over the other as result of rent-seeking and
rent extraction does not render that outcome useless. Politics, after all, are
ephemeral and fleeting; when political motivations subside or, more likely
shift, underlying fundamentals will ultimately prevail if those
fundamentals have been sufficiently defined.

129Jeffrey

H. Birnbaum, Buyout Firms to Avoid a Tax Hike; Reid Passes Word Senate

Won't Act, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2007, at Al ("Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (DNev.) has told private-equity firms in recent weeks that a tax-hike proposal they have spent
millions of dollars to defeat will not get through the Senate this year, according to
executives and lobbyists.").

